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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

Mr.

White

never

became

subject

to

the

Court's

jurisdiction because he was never served and no appearance was made
for

him.

The

Court

never

obtained

jurisdiction

over

the

partnership because the automatic bankruptcy stay was never lifted,
the trustee never served, and the general partners could no longer
act for the partnership because it was in dissolution.
2.

The original judgment did not provide for post judgment

interest.

Because it was based on a promissory note but did not

specify any interest, U.C.A. 15-1-4 does not allow the judgment to
be interpreted to accrue interest.
pray for post judgment

Because the complaint did not

interest, Plaintiffs limited themselves.

Amending the judgment now is not allowed.
3.

Equity demands an offset

for the value of Stockings1

property in excess of the price Barbers paid the beneficiary (only
one day before a trust deed sale) where they only bought it because
of their judgment.
requiring

an offset

The trial court abused its discretion by not
for

the $20,000 bid

Barbers made

for one

partner's interest in real property because they bid at their own
risk.

Failure to require this credit was contrary to the court's

previous order made during pendency of the original judgment.
4.

The Rule 54(b) Order allows appeal of the trial court's

refusal to dismiss counts 2 and 3 of the Amended Complaint.
5.

Significant material fact issues were presented to the

trial court but ignored.

The Court abused the review standard for

summary judgment matters.

1

6.

Defendants' presentation of argument and evidence that

the original judgment had not been amended to allow post judgment
interest was not an act deserving of sanctions.

That this and

other

not only

arguments were made more

Defendants believed

than once shows

that

in their arguments, but also that the trial

court repeatedly failed

to address them.

The issues raised by

Defendants were not considered by the trial court.

The Court of

Appeals did not get to the merits of these issues. Defendants were
not collaterally estopped from raising them here, and should not
be punished for having done so in good faith.
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ARGUMENT
I.
MR. WHITE AND THE PARTNERSHIP WERE NEVER
SERVED AND ARE NOT PARTIES
WHITE NOT A PARTY
Of

the

four

joint

obligors, Don

White

and

Partnership were not served in the present action.
were named, they were never made parties.

Where

the

Emporium

Although they
liability

is

joint, all the Defendants must be sued and served, unless service
is waived.

In

this

restricted appearances.

case

it

was

not

waived

because

of

the

See, generally the cases cited on page 13

of the Appeal Brief including Pi Hard , L.C. Jones Trucking Company,
Palle, Garcia, and Madsen.
Any argument

that general appearances waived a requirement

that Don White be individually served

ignores the plain record.

After Mr. Malouf was served, before Mr. Stocking was served, Malouf
filed a Motion on his own behalf to dismiss.
1987, Von Stocking, having been served

Record 4-17.

(Record

May 8,

19) specifically

entered his appearance and joined in the Motion filed previously
by Mr. Malouf.

Record 27.

The Reply in Support oi: Defendants1

Motion to Dismiss and Strike (Record 28) was made specifically on
behalf

of

"Defendants

appearing

herein".

Such

reference

was

obviously only to the two Defendants who had each been served and
who had appeared.

The Answer and Counterclaim filed on behalf of

Von Stocking and Ray Malouf was filed specifically in their names
July 23, 1987. Record 62. The lead paragraph called attention to
the fact that Don White was considered by them not to be a party.

The Answer was filed:
Reserving the right to answer for Don A.
White, Jr. if and when he becomes a party, .
• •

The second defense in the answer provided as follows:
The Court
lacks
jurisdiction over the
Defendant Partnership, which is in dissolution
and has filed bankruptcy, and Plaintiff has
failed to remove the effects of the automatic
stay under 11 U.S.C. Sec. 362, and has not
attempted to name the bankruptcy trustee or
serve him as a party, all of which is
necessary to obtain jurisdiction over the
partnership, and the other Defendants, who may
only be liable if the Partnership is liable.
The ninth defense alleged

that

the Plaintiffs had waived or

compromised their claims against each of the answering Defendants
by, among other things, operation of law.

This had reference to

the fact that all of the required Defendants had not become
parties.

There is and was no evidence that a summons had issued

to be served on Don A. White, Jr., that Don had been served, or
otherwise became a party.
When Plaintiffs filed their amended Complaint July 23, 1987
(Record 66), the lead sentence was that the Plaintiffs restated
their original Complaint as the first cause of action.

They also

specified that additional parties were being joined as Defendants
in the second and third causes of action.

Those are the parties

who the Court did not dismiss on subsequent motions, for whom
relief is requested in this appeal under Part IV in the Appeal
Brief.

Those parties were separately served with summons, unlike

Don White.
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After Defendants* Motions to Dismiss the amended Complaint
were denied, September 23, 1987, they filed the Amended Answer and
Counterclaim,

Record

114.

The

first

two

paragraphs

are

as

follows:
COME NOW Defendants herein, with the
exception of Logan Savings & Loan, which is
not represented by the undersigned, and answer
the amended Complaint, Counterclaim and Claim
as follows:
ANSWER TO FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
Defendants incorporate by reference, as
if fully set forth herein, the answering
Counterclaim filed July 23, 1987, together
with each of the FIRST, SECOND, THIRD, FOURTH,
FIFTH, SIXTH, SEVENTH, EIGHTH AND NINTH
DEFENSES set forth therein.
This response preserved the original Answer and Counterclaim, which
had

specifically

excluded

an appearance

by

Don A. White, Jr.

Answering on behalf of Mall Defendants herein except Logan Savings
& Loan" was not the same as an entry of appearance for Don A.
White, who had not been served.
include Don A. White.
First

Cause

of

"The Defendants herein" did not

He was only a potential Defendant to the

Action.

Because

the

original

Answer

and

Counterclaim was not filed on behalf of Don A. White, specifically
said he was not a party and reserved the right to answer for him
if and when he became a party, the Amended Complaint did nothing
to make him any more a party than he already was.

From July 23,

1987 onward. Plaintiffs were on notice that Don White had not been
made a party.
serve him.

If they wanted him included, they would have to

They

never

did.

When

the trial court

said

this

Judgment would be against Don White as well as Malouf and Stocking,

5

the Court exceeded

its jurisdictional authority.

Mr. White was

never served, has not entered his appearance, and no answer has
been made on his behalf.

Because no effort was made to join Don

as a party, Plaintiffs waived their right to join him when they
proceeded

with

summary

judgment.

By electing

not

to proceed

against all obligors, they may not be entitled to have judgment
against any.
PARTNERSHIP NOT A PARTY
Plaintiffs admitted

the stay wasn't

lifted and elected

to

proceed without lifting the automatic stay against the Partnership.
In the Record, page 20, they say:
Plaintiffs do not dispute that the effect of
bankruptcy involves an automatic stay against
the continuance and further (sic) of any
action against the Partnership.
However,
there are various decisions holding
the
renewal of a judgment with no other action
taken is not a violation of the automatic
stay.
Whatever the ruling of this Court is
with respect to that issue. Plaintiffs will
accept . If the appropriate ruling is that the
Complaint as against Defendant Emporium should
be dismissed, the Plaintiffs will not dispute
that ruling provided that there is no ruling
that the individual partners are thereby
rendered
immune from a renewal of this
judgment. (emphasis added)
Plaintiffs did

not cite any authority

to support

the foregoing

arguments. Apparently the trial court did not require any, because
in its Memorandum Decision, the court wrote what Defendants thought
was nonsense, on page 43 of the Record:
Plaintiffs are not seeking to bring any new
suit on any other claim except to re-new (sic)
a judgment already granted.
An existing
bankruptcy may stay proceedings that
is
working toward a judgment, but it does not
estop (sic) the Plaintiffs from re-newing
(sic) a judgment already received prior to any

6

bankruptcy proceedings*
The Court was at least unaware that all joint obligors had to
be included in any renewal judgment. Defendants filed a Notice of
Objections to the proposed form of the Order, citing the lack of
law to support the Findings. Defendants noted in their Objections
the Court did not address the question of how a judgment could be
obtained against the general partners if the partnership was not
also liable.
Plaintiffs' reliance on Volume 59A, American Jurisprudence,
is not adequate to solve the jurisdiction problem.

The quoted

language only goes far enough to say that service on a partner is
sufficient to give the Court jurisdiction over the partnership,
whether the partner is served as an agent of the partnership or
not. Without citing any Utah cases, they argue the Rule should not
change because the Partnership is in dissolution.

However, Utah

has a specific statute, U.C.A. 48-1-30, which provides that on
dissolution a partner can no longer act for the partnership.

The

reference in Am.Jur. does not address the case where a partnership
is in bankruptcy, a trustee appointed and an automatic stay in
effect.
Finally, Plaintiffs' argument wholly misses the question of
jurisdiction on Don White, which cannot be obtained by serving the
other partners.
PARTNERSHIP HAS ASSETS
Without

addressing

Defendants' arguments relying on this

Court's decision in McCune, Plaintiffs baldly allege that they have
seen no evidence that Emporium Partnership has assets. That does

7

not solve the issue of renewing a joint judgment against only some
debtors.

It does not absolve them of seeking assets.

McCune

requires the Partnership be served, made a party, and that the
Plaintiff exhaust its assets first. The Plaintiffs should have to
allege and prove the Partnership has no assets to avoid joining the
Partnership as a party. Now they have waived the right to do that,
and should not be able to get judgment against the individual
partners.

Plaintiffs acknowledged the automatic bankruptcy stay

prohibits an action to collect against the Emporium.

It was the

Plaintiffs' burden to get that stay lifted. They did not do that.
Because it is in the interest of the individual partners to get the
benefit of the stay for the partnership, they had every right to
raise this as a defense.
Finally, the Partnership
affirmed

a

joint

and

does have assets.

several

judgment

against

This Court
Millenium

Corporation, J. Ron Stacey and Wayne Johnson, Supreme Court Nos.
20273; 20282, and an Amended Judgment is entered in Cache Co., Wo.
18030, for 3158,835.83 plus interest.
II.
THE FIRST JUDGMENT DIDN'T ALLOW POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST;
THE RENEWAL JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT EITHER
Most judgments do bear interest.
is renewed, interest would continue.

If one that bears interest
Perhaps the trial court

thought the original judgment allowed post judgment interest. It
did not examine the original judgment to see whether it could or
did provide for interest after judgment.

Appeal Brief Addendum

Item 1 contains the Complaint; Item 2 contains the Judgment.

8

Rule 8(a) U.R.C.P. says a pleading which sets forth a claim
for relief shall contain a (1) statement of the claims showing the
pleader is entitled to relief and (2) a demand for judgment for the
relief

to which he deems himself entitled.

Even though the

Promissory Note was attached to the Complaint as an Exhibit, it
cannot replace the requirement that there be specific averments as
Rule 8 requires. Since Judgment was rendered in this case on the
pleadings at the Plaintiffs1 request, there was no opportunity to
introduce evidence or to amend the Complaint to conform to the
evidence, so Plaintiffs were limited in their judgment to what they
had actually asked for without reference to the note. See Girard
discussion, page 23 of the Appeal Brief.

This set of facts

distinguishes this case from other cases which have gone to trial
and which may talk about the interest issue being injected by law.
See for example, Fitzgerald v. Critchfield, 744 P.2d. 301 (UT App.
1987) at 304; Liqnell v. Berg, 593 P.2d. 800, 809 (UT 1979), which
are easily distinguishable.
Plaintiffs own arguments limit their relief to what they can
have under U.C.A. 15-1-4, as argued by their Appellants' Brief in
Case No. 870128-CA. That Brief refers to one case only. We would
like to distinguish Dairy Distributors, Inc. v. Local Union 976,
et al., 12 U.2d. 85, 396 P.2d. 47 (1964), because it is the only
basis for an argument this Judgment is entitled to post judgment
interest. In 1963, Dairy Distributors as Plaintiff filed a Motion
to Amend the 1957 Judgment to provide for interest after the
Judgment. The Motion was actually granted. The Findings show the
Clerk of the Court failed because of oversight and inadvertence to

9

fill in blanks provided for interest under Rule 54(e).

That Rule

requires the Clerk to include interest in any judgment signed by
him if the same has been ascertained.

Because of the Clerk's

omission, the Court applied U.C.A. 15-1-4 and said interest could
be accrued and collected even though the Judgment had not provided
it.

The Court said in Dairy Distributors that the only issue was

the lapse in time from the Judgment until the Motion to include the
interest.

The case had gone to trial.

In the instant case there are numerous additional problems
that distinguish Dairy Distributors.

The instant case does not

involve the signing of a Judgment by the Clerk or the filling in
of blanks.

The Judgment was signed by the Judge and prepared by

the Plaintiffs. No oversight or inadvertence has ever been alleged
in the instant case by the Plaintiffs who now want to have interest
added in a renewal judgment.

No Clerk oversight or inadvertence

exists. The Plaintiffs filed no motion to correct the Judgment and
did not collect it before it expired.

They are trying to broaden

its terms in the renewal judgment. Because of the Clerk's omission
in the Dairy Distributors case, U.C.A. 15-1-4 could be applied.
The instant case, however, will not justify the interest Barbers
want to add.

The instant case was not entirely silent on the

subject of interest.
until paid.

It provided a specific amount of interest

That language operates as a limitation.

Anyone can

see there was a deficiency in draftsmanship at a minimum, and that
to provide for accruing interest after judgment one has to read
between the lines, contrary to the literal words.
judgment, however, agrees completely

10

with

The instant

the prayer

of the

Complaint on which it was based.
In Preece vs. Preece, 682 P.2d. 298 CUT 1984) this Court
referred to Dairy Distributors for authority ". . . to do an act
upon one date and make it effective as of a prior date so that the
record accurately reflects that which took place."

Id. at 299.

The Preece decision also originated from Judge Christoffersen's
Court.

The Judge said the Decree would be final "upon signing".

He signed the Decree after Mr. Preece died, but made the divorce
effective on the hearing date.

The Supreme Court recognized the

trial court's act as a substantial departure from its earlier
announcement, and directed the Decree be vacated and the divorce
action dismissed.

Mrs. Preece was a surviving widow instead of a

divorced spouse.

This Court said that even nunc pro tunc orders

" . . . should be the reflection of a previously made ruling."
at 300.

Id.

So, as in Dairy Distributors, Preece applied the review

standard that judgments could be changed only to reflect what had
actually

previously

previously

been

made ruling

done.

The

to support

instant

case

lacks the

Plaintiff's position.

The

renewal judgment clearly differs from the original judgment.
The function of nunc pro tunc orders is not to make an order
"now for then, but to enter now for then an order previously made"
Id. at 299. Since there was never a previous order in the instant
case allowing anything more than "accrued interest • . . from the
date hereof (April 18, 1979) until paid in the amount of $2,180",
more interest is not allowed.

Judge Christoffersen!s so-called

renewal judgment allowing post-judgment interest should be vacated,
just as his extra legal action in Preece was disallowed in 1984.
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The relief Defendants asked for before the Court of Appeals
was to strike writs of execution.
Defendants had not appealed

The Court of Appeals said the

the writs soon enough.

No other

conclusion should be given their opinion.
The

Plaintiffs

only

hope

for

interest

is some

literal

application of U.C.A. Sec. 15-1-4. The statute in question refers
to two applications:
15-1-4 Interest on Judgments. Any judgment
rendered on a lawful contract shal1 conform
thereto and shal1 bear the interest agreed
upon by the parties, which shall be specified
in the judgment; other judgments shall bear
interest at the rate of 12% per annum,
(emphasis added.)
Thus, a judgment based on the contract such as a promissory note,
including this case, shal1 specify on its face the amount of
interest allowed.

Since this Judgment does not specify post

judgment interest, Plaintiffs should be deemed to have not complied
with the statute, and therefore not be entitled to interest. After
all, they drafted the Complaint and the Judgment and elected to
file a Motion for Judgment on the pleadings.
In Stroud vs. Stroud, 738 P.2d. 649

(UT App. 1987) the

interest issue was being discussed in the context of one of the
'•other11 kinds of judgments. The meaning of the word "shall" became
important.

The opinion says:

According to the Utah Supreme Court, the
meaning of the word "shall" is usually or
ordinarily presumed to be mandatory (authority
cited) Sec. 15-1-4 is a very specific statute
while Sec. 30-3-5(1) is much more general.
"When two statutory provisions appear to
conflict, the more specific provision will
govern over the more general provision"
(authority cited).
Id. at 650.
(emphasis
added)
12

A judgment on a note must specify the interest.

If it does

not, it is not entitled to bear interest.
Plaintiffs may say it is only fair to get
Stroud

Court

addressed

the question

of

equity

interest.
when

The

there are

conflicting statutes, and said it agreed with Arizona that where
rights are established and defined by statute, equity has no power
to change or upset such rights.

Id. at 651.

Defendants rely on

the literal language of Sec. 15-1-4 to foreclose Plaintiffs from
accruing post-judgment interest, where this statute does not allow
a judgment to add post-judgment

interest, and this judgment was

built on a Complaint which did not even allege the right to it.
The Plaintiffs did not refute the fact that the Complaint did not
ask for post-judgment interest; that post-judgment interest is not
in the judgment; that they admitted the judgment does not allow
for

interest, and

concepts

to

get

that

they

interest.

are
No

dependent
dispute

is

on

extra-judgment

raised

about

promissory note being a contract, or that the original

the

judgment

does not provide for post-judgment interest.
This Court

is free to reappraise the trial

conclusions because the summary judgment granted

court's legal
in the instant

case was not granted on facts, but because of a misapprehension in
law.

See Docutel Olivetti Corp. v. Dick Brady Systems, Inc., 731

P.2d. 475 (UT 1986) .
III.
REGARDLESS OF THE AMOUNT OF THE RENEWAL JUDGMENT,
MOST OF IT SHOULD BE DETERMINED TO HAVE BEEN PAID.
That the Court should do equity is not a new legal theory.

11

No less authority than the Constitution of the State of Utah,
Article VIII, Sec. 19 provides:
There shall be but one form of civil action,
and law and equity may be administered in the
same action.
The Courts can administer both law and equity in one action.
A person who has suffered injury to property may go the District
Court.

If his statement of facts will apply to the law entitling

him to relief, the Court

is bound to grant him relief, either

legal, equitable, or both. While legal relief may be distinguished
from equitable relief, the substance and not tne form of things
controls.
177.

See generally Jenkins vs. Nicolas, 63 U. 329, 225 P.

Weyant vs. Utah Savings & Trust Company, 54 U. 181, 182 P.

189, 9 A.L.R. 1119; and Utah Assn. of Credit Man v. Jones, 49 U.
519. 164 P. 1029.

This Court has allowed Plaintitfs to recover

money obtained by fraud, an equitable remedy. Kuttes vs. Luke, 59
U. 324 203 P. 347.
In the

instant

case, Defendants seek

Stocking's house in excess

the value of Von

of what Plaintiffs paid one day before

a trust deed sale for the beneficiary's interest. That this relief
would be equitable is amply supported by the evidence marshalled
in the Appeal Brief, beginning at the bottom of page 24. The only
reason Barbers bought the beneficial interest in the property was
because of this judgment.

They would not do this if they did not

believe they would recover value in excess of the price paid. The
trial court abused

its discretion by not reducing the renewal

judgment for this, or by not justifying ignoring this disputed
issue of fact.

The matter is not res judicata; it happened after

the original judgment.

If there is no law directly supporting an

equitable offset, this is an excellent case in which to make it.
LEGAL OFFSET FOR BID
During the pendency of the original judgment Plaintiffs had
an execution sale against the interest of Mr. Malouf in residential
property.

Mr. Malouf set forth reasons why he had no interest in

the property, but Barbers proceeded anyway and bid 320,000. After
the sale, Mr. Malouf did not contest the validity of the sale.
Now, Barbers allege there is an issue on the validity of the sale,
and want to be excused from crediting their bid under Rule 69(g) (2)
U.R.C.P.

However, that

section

only

applies

if there were

irregularities or the property was not subject to sale.

Barbers

did not allege there were irregularities or that the property was
not subject to sale. Barbers cite nothing from the Record to show
Defendants contested the sale after the sale. They did not contest
it.

This Court upheld the rule that "caveat emptor" applies, and

one reference is Kimbal1, at page 28 of the Appeal Brief.
The trial court abused its discretion by not requiring the
renewal judgment, in whatever amount, to be credited by the amount
of this bid, as it had ordered

in the underlying proceedings.

Record Case No. 870128-CA, Cache County, No. 17630, pages 379-381.
That was the law of the case.

The Court should have found the

Barbers in contempt of Court under Rule 69(e)(4), instead of
granting summary judgment against the Defendants.
Both these offsets should apply to the benefit of all the
Defendants.

In F.D.I.C. v. Bismarck Inv. Corp., 547 P.2d. 212 (UT

1976) this Court said:

15

If judgment is taken against all who are
jointly obligated, a judgment creditor may get
satisfaction from any of the debtors, and the
one who is compelled to pay the joint
obligation has his rights to have contribution
against his joint obligors, and this is true
whether the judgment is against them or not.
In the instant case, judgment is not taken against all who are
jointly obligated.
made.

Even if judgment was proper, credit has to be

In the Jorgensen case, discussed on page 29 of the Appeal

Brief, the majority opinion and the dissenting opinions all agree
that a bid made on an execution must be credited somewhere.

It is

the Barbers' unmet burden to show they should not have to credit
the bid under the facts of this case.
Plaintiffs may have hoped to keep resolution of the legal bid
out of the appeal by attempting to segregate the rest of the
amended complaint from their summary judgment. However, the legal
requirement to credit that bid is independent of who has the real
rights to Malouf's property.
IV.
THE AMENDED COMPLAINT IN ITS ENTIRETY IS
PROPERLY BEFORE THE APPEALS COURT
The basis for discussing the issues related in the fourth
point in the Appeal Brief is two-fold. First, Defendants moved to
dismiss the Amended part of the Complaint when it was filed,
(Record 93-99).

The trial court abused its discretion in not

dismissing, based on the arguments referred to beginning at page
29 in the Appeal Brief.

Plaintiffs' attempt to join parties who

were not Defendants in the original judgment in this renewal action
need not be supported and is legally unjustifiable. These persons
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are indirectly interested in the appeal, and were subiect to orders
of the trial court •
Secondly, the Rule 54(b) Order signed December 27, 1968, said
that :
• . . the Order entered October 4. 1983, and
all previous orders of the Court pertaining to
the
Complaint,
Amended
Complai nt,
Counterclaim, Amended Counterclaim, and Third
Party Complaint were final and appealable
orders under Rule 54(b), U.R.C.P., and there
is no just reason for delay in allowing the
Defendants and Third Party Appellants who are
parties in this action to bring their appeal,
(emphasis added)
Thus, anyone who is a party can appeal any order on the Amended
Complaint.

The trial court's refusal to dismiss counts two and

three of the Amended Complaint are legal questions properly here
for review.

A more thorough basis for dismissing this part of the

Amended Complaint is in the Record between pages 94 and 111; and
113.

The Court's decision allowing the Amended Complaint to be

filed against

other parties was a final

legal ruling, and

its

resolution of the facts is not necessary for a review of that
order .
V.
MATERIAL FACT ISSUES STILL REMAIN
The Record contains two locations where Defendants summarize
material issues of fact.
on pages 166 and 167.

First, ten fact questions are enumerated

Second, a summary listing of 14 issues of

fact is on pages 204 through 207. These were distilled into lists
on pages 33 through 36 of the Appeal Brief.

The reason Defendants

listed them was that Barbers failed to set forth factual issues in

motions for summary judgment.

If there is one material question

of fact, summary judgment was inappropriate.

The following facts

were not disposed of by the trial court in a way which showed they
were not material:
1.

The words of the original judgment
don't allow post-judgment interest.
The Court
has
to
justify
any
amendment.

2.

Did the appeals court decide the
question of post-judgment interest
on the merits?

3.

Mo irregularities were raised oy
Defendants to allow Plaintiffs a
claim
for
relief
under
Rule
69(g)(2).

A.

Did the appeals court rule on the
trial court's prior order in the
original judgment that Plaintiffs
credit their bid on the merits?

5.

Why
shouldn't
the
trial
court
require Plaintiffs to credit their
bid?

6.

Did Barbers take Mr. and Mrs. Von
Stockings1 property to help collect
on this judgment?

7.

What is the value of the equitable
offset
due
for
Von
Stocking's
property?

8.

Was
the stay
lifted
to allow
proceeding
against
the Emporium
Limited Partnership?
What facts
justify doing it anyway?

9.

Did the Emporium
assets?

10.

How can a judgment enter against
only some of "joint" Defendants?
What facts allow judgment against
Don White?

11.

Did all joint Defendants get served
or waive service of process?
1 Q

Partnership

have

12.

Whether the Barbers should
have
known the lien they filed
was
groundless; and whether it was.

13.

Whether Barbers released the lien
within 20 days after Defendants'
written request that it be removed.

14.

What
specific
acts
or
facts
justified the trial court's order of
sanctions.

None of the foregoing matters were addressed adequately by
the trial court.

The District Court should not work by magic, and

should not take Plaintiffs' word about what had happened in the
case.

The Court abused its discretion by not making

rational inquiries of the facts.
raised before the trial court.
by ignoring them.

reasoned,

All the foregoing issues were

They were not disposed of, except

If the original 1979 judgment is to be renewed,

all of them need to be fairly dealt with.

None of those questions

were decided by the first judgment in 1979.
The trial court should have inquired whether there was any
genuine

issue as to any material

fact and,

if there was not,

whether the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter ot
law.

The

statements and

should be treated as

evidentiary

materials

of

Appellants

if a jury would receive them as the only

credible evidence, and the summary judgment below should only be
sustained if no issues of fact which could affect the outcome can
be discerned.

Zions First National Bank vs. Clark Clinic Corp.,

762 P.2d. 1090 (UT 1988) .
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VI .
SANCTIONS AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS ARE INAPPROPRIATE.
Anyone should see the original judgment did not provide for
post-judgment interest.
209).

Even Barbers admitted this (Record 208-

For reminding the trial court of this when it authorized

writs during the course of the original judgment, and during the
course of this action, Defendants have yet to receive definitive
answer

about

when the original

judgment

changed.

The Court

offered no legal justification for the change. This deficiency in
the original judgment was fixed by improvements made to it by
Plaintiffs and the trial court.

That does not make it right.

There is a legal and factual basis for Defendants1 arguments.
They should not be penalized for making the arguments. Eventually
they expect justice to be done. Plaintiffs enshrine themselves in
a tower unsupported by the Record or the law, and ask the trial
court to "trust me" about the awful things Defendants did in
raising these issues. Plaintiffs' brief fails to explain away the
arguments.

There are legally defensible arguments against the

renewal judgment.

There is no basis for granting sanctions for

having made the arguments where the trial court ignored them.
Post-judgment interest on the original judgment would require
some

kind

amendment.

of

a

modification

of

the

original

Barbers make no showing of where this amendment is.

A writ of execution is not an amendment.
attempted to refute this.
of

May

appeal.

judgment, an

After the Court's Memorandum Decision

18, 1987, Defendants petitioned
This was denied

Barbers have never

July 21, 1987.
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for

an

interlocutory

(Supreme Court No.

870232). Now the question of the Court's May 18, 1987, Memorandum
Decision relied on by the Plaintiff is properly before the Court.
This decision is in the Record, pages 43, 44 and 47. Perhaps this
was an attempt to amend the original judgment.

The trial court

said, "There is included in the renewal continuance of interest on
the judgment. This is not a modification."
The foregoing statement assumed the original judgment allowed
post-judgment interest.
the language.

It does not allow it without going beyond

The Court has never explained this.

The Order

Plaintiffs prepared to implement that Memorandum Decision extends
the error by use of "except", implying the Court was allowing
modification in the judgment to include continuing interest. This
shows Plaintiffs acknowledged that continuance of interest on the
original judgment really is a modification.

Both Plaintiffs and

the trial court thought this was acceptable.

Defendants do not.

Plaintiffs next make a personal attack on Defendants' counsel
for asking for actual damages, plus alternative basi for punitive
damages in the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint. In
quoting from Defendants' pleadings (Record 119), Plaintiffs forgot
to quote paragraph 5 asking for $90,000 for breach of promise
damages

against

each

of

the

Plaintiffs

and

their

counsel.

Defendants plead for actual damages, plus ask for damages for
Plaintiffs' seeking an illegal judgment with malicious intent, for
abuse of process, and breach of promise.

To best appreciate the

total amount which Defendants requested, reference to page 120 of
the Record is suggested, where the prayer is as follows:
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray for judgment
against each Plaintiff and Third Party

Defendant in the amount of the excess payments
on the prior judgment, general damages,
interest and punitive damages, plus additional
punitive damages in the amount of $225,000 to
each Defendant from each Plaintiff and Third
Party Defendant, plus costs of this suit and
legal costs, and for such other and further
relief as is appropriate.
From the foregoing Defendants wanted actual damages, costs, fees
and punitive damages. The punitive damages could only be awarded
if Defendants proved Plaintiffs and their counsel intentionally,
fraudulently, maliciously, wrongfully or with gross negligence
sought an illegal judgment. Defendants have shown sufficient legal
basis to go to trial on that question.
After the Court of Appeals denied, for timeliness reasons
only, the appeal of a writ in the original judgment, Plaintiffs
apparently thought this was a decision on the merits of postjudgment interest.

It was not.

Plaintiffs pretend they made a

reasonable request for the Amended Counterclaim pleadings to be
"excised".

It is interesting to read the demand.

Record, pages 152 and 153.
made in this fashion.
16, 1988, at 2:00 p.m.
June 20, 1988, at

It is in the

One must wonder why the request was

The letter was delivered on Thursday, June
It demanded a written response by Monday,

1:00 p.m.

This Record

is devoid

of any

allegations or references, save in this demand, that Defendant's
had violated Section 78-7-19.

In fact, they had not.

In the

demand, Mr. Daines said that he intended to request sanctions if
the pleadings were not withdrawn.
After reviewing the intense nature of the demand, the appeals
court ought to look at the motions filed for sanctions and summary

judgment in the file, beginning at page 123 of the Record. There,
it is seen the motions for summary judgment and for sanctions were
filed June 20, 1988, at 12:16 p.m., about 45 minutes before the
deadline.

We can see just how Plaintiffs' counsel went about his

business. The Court ought to at least question the sincerity, the
necessity, and the accuracy of Plaintiffs' requests for changes to
the pleading.

It is interesting to note that the Plaintiffs never

moved to strike the Counterclaim.
Damages have been approved by this court in cases of malicious
prosecution.

See Terry v. Z.C.M.I.. 605 P.2d 314 (.Utah 1979,

allowing 315,000 punitive damages); and Shippers' Best Exp., Inc.
v. Newsome, 579 P.2d. 1316 ^Utah 1978).

Even though Terry was

reversed to require actual malice rather than malice in law (lack
of probable cause) in the context of another shoplifting case, the
actual malice standard for punitive damages is sustainable by the
facts in this case.
Counsel for the Defendants denies any parts of U.C.A. 78-5126 were violated.

There was a legal and a factual basis for all

of the claims raised by the Defendants. That reasonable basis is
set forth in the Record and the Appeal Brief.

Assertions for

violating this statute could more properly be made against counsel
for the Plaintiffs.
Defendants' actions appear to Defendants and their counsel to
be legal and just, even though justice was foreign to the trial
court and the Plaintiffs.
Defendants deny that Rule of Professional Conduct 3.1 (1988)
was violated.

Actions not frivolous are defined there to include
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those for which there is a good faith argument for an extension,
modification or reversal of existing
trial court were made in good faith.

law.

The arguments to the

Even if Defendants should

have known their position would not prevail

in the trial court

because of those courts* failure to review the law and the facts
in the file. Defendants believe the Utah Supreme Court has the
ability

to recognize

not only

that

the arguments made by

Defendants were made in good faith, but that

the

they are correct.

Sanctions should never be given to foster a "loser pay" view of the
court.

The

appeals

court

could

find

the

Plaintiffs

were

overreach 1ng.
Having been challenged by Defendants to show where any Court
has analyzed the issues raised. Plaintiffs persist in relying on
glittering generalities without substance.
too trusting

The trial court became

in repetitive statements by Plaintiffs that issues

had been resolved, which in fact had not.
issues to get rid of the case.

It glossed over real

The Utah Court of Appeals in State

vs. Barlow, 102 UT Adv. Rep. 28 i.1988) reversed
contempt against Mr. Barlow.
court

committed

error

the holding of

The Appeals Court agreed the trial

in finding

contempt, apparently

having persisted in a demand for a twelve person jury.

for his
The Court

agreed that the provisions of U.C.A. Sec. 78-32-3 must be followed,
holding the trial court committed error by not making the required
order reciting the facts which formed the basis for contempt.
The trial court, with encouragement from the Plaintiffs, seems
to have found contempt based on some idea that the issues being
raised

by the Defendants had already been raised
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and

resolved

numerous times. The Appeal Brief explains why such representations
were false.
Plaintiffs variously attempt to apply some concept of res
judicata to bar Defendants from raising their arguments, and punish
the Defendants for having raised them, by imposing sanctions. The
trial court obviously believed there were no factual issues before
it, only questions of law or it should not have granted summary
judgment.

The question arises as to whether certain issues have

been already litigated or not.

Plaintiffs argue that they were,

and that the Defendants are somehow collaterally estopped from
raising them in the present action.

Collateral estoppel simply

means that where a party to an action has actually litigated
certain issues in one action, and those issues of fact have been
determined against him, he is precluded from re-1itigating those
same issues in a later action.

It comes from the doctrine of res

judicata. It is a form of partial res judicata because its binding
effect

is limited

to the issues actually decided

in a prior

dispute, rather than foreclosing the entire controversy.
Collateral estoppel applies only to questions of fact and not
to questions of law.

Although a party to an action may have had

a case or issue decided against him based on the law, this does not
mean that this party cannot in a different action insist that the
law is otherwise, even if the action is between the same parties
or a party to the first action.

See United States vs. Moser, 266

U.S. 236, 45 S.Ct. 66 (1924). The party against whom the doctrine
of collateral estoppel is sought to be invoked must have had a full
opportunity to contest that issue in the prior proceeding.
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One

reason sanctions are inappropriate in this case is that the trial
court never granted such an opportunity to Defendants,
CONCLUSION
Defendants stand by the points made in the Appeal Brief.
Plaintiffs still have not shown how it is possible to pursue only
some joint obligors. They do not deny the original judgment said
nothing about post-judgment interest. They have never shown where
it was changed to allow it to accrue. They did get the trial court
to agree to their request to add
judgment.

it in, without amending the

Not until an effort was made to renew the judgment did

the Court pretend to amend the judgment.

It issued an opinion

that interest on the first judgment was not a modification.
was error.

This

The original judgment was not amended by writs of

execution, by the Court, or ever.
The amount owed on any renewal Judgment must be reduced for
Plaintiffs1 bid because they were aware the debtor had no interest
in the property before they made the bid. This Court should order
an equitable offset for the value of the Von Stocking property,
taken over on the eve of a trust deed sale.
involves

Stocking

vs. Barber

(No. 890141) .

A related appeal
The

denial

of

Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint is a legal
issue properly appealed.
to be considered.

The Rule 54(b) Order allows this issue

Numerous factual issues remain which were not

addressed by the trial court, except by ignoring them. The Court's
summary

award

of

sanctions

against

the

Defendants

was

not

justified, even after the fact, by the Record or by the law.
Summary Judgment should be reversed and relief granted to the
96

Defendants consistent with what has been asked, including payment
of their costs and attorney f-ees

on appeal; dismissal of the order

for sanctions; a remand of the case to the trial court with an
order that it credit

the bid and have a hearing as to the value

of the Stocking property; and an order that

the Plaintiffs are

limited in their effort ^o renew a judgment to the amount allowed
in the original judgment which has not been amended and does not
include post-judgment

interest; and

Plaintiffs are not entitled

finally

an order

that

the

to judgment at all unless they can

legally join all of the joint obligors and first exhaust the assets
of the partnership.
Respectfully submitted this 16th day of May, 1989.
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